Yet the instability within Somalia that allows piracy to flourish on the seas also creates not only the potential for greater regional conflict, but, now, the actuality of it. The suicide bombings in Kampala mark another downward step in the fighting that is pitting East Africans against East Africans. Political, cultural and religious differences are being inflamed on land. The worry from those I speak to is that those same divisive elements may be transferred to the nautical theater in the coming months. The suicide attacks in Uganda were reportedly carried out in reprisal of that country's support of the TFG in Somalia. But it should be noted that most Western nations also support the TFG, and an attack on our naval forces would receive considerably more publicity.
Showing posts with label Somalia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Somalia. Show all posts
Friday, July 16, 2010
Somalia's troubles extend landward
While the piracy problems plaguing the coasts of Somalia are, by now, well known, there has been little attention paid to the regional expansion of land-based strife caused by the internal situation in that country. Some may have noted the attacks carried out in Uganda last weekend, though the news of the deaths and injuries that occurred were mostly overlooked.
Tuesday, June 15, 2010
World Cup Weirdness
The most popular sporting event on the planet is currently unfolding in South Africa: the World Cup of football (or soccer to some). As billions of people around the globe follow the teams playing, the impact of trying to watch has led to some dire results.
As EagleSpeak noted earlier, some football fans in Somalia were executed on the weekend by Islamist militants for the crime of tuning in to catch a game. As reported by The Telegraph's Aislinn Laing, supporters of Hizbul Islam stormed a house near Mogadishu where a group had gathered to watch last Saturday's Nigeria-Argentina match. Ten people were arrested by the militants, and two others were killed. The Islamist militants feel that watching sporting events - like the World Cup - contravenes their interpretation of what is acceptable social behavior in those parts of Somalia under their control.
Today also saw the North Korean team facing off against the event's number one ranked team, Brazil (North Korea is the lowest ranked in the tournament). To their credit, the North Koreans - er, Korea DPRers - managed to score a late game goal against the favored Brazilians, who nevertheless took the match by a score of 2-1.
As the game played out, diplomats met at the United Nations in New York to discuss the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan in March, which resulted in the death of 46 sailors. As AFP reports, the North Korean ambassador to the UN asked that his countrymen be allowed to conduct their own investigation, including visiting the site of the sinking. He also warned that the Hermit Kingdom might take "military action" should the world body censure his nation over the sinking. Should the Security Council take action against North Korea, the ambassador said that, "follow-up measures will be carried out by our military forces...I [will] lose my job."
Not sure what he meant by the last quip, but, then again, one doesn't want to piss off the Dear Leader back in Pyongyang in any way. And I'm sure the ambassador isn't going to be Tweeting anyone like a few people in South Africa have: "Dear Leader does not know I'm not at work."
Friday, March 19, 2010
Al-Shabaab Recruiting Young Somali-Canadians?
As some may remember, there was a brief flurry of media attention last year regarding the whereabouts of a number of Somali-Americans from the Minneapolis area, with the suspicion raised that several had joined up with militia groups in their homeland, including al-Shabaab. At that time, Sen. Joseph Lieberman labeled the issue the, "[M]ost serious instance of homegrown terrorism in the United States...There obviously are people here in the United States recruiting young Somali-Americans to go over to Somalia to be trained to fight."
Well, it now appears that the problem has spread to the Somali community in Canada. This week news broke that at least one young man who had been living in Toronto had returned to Somalia and reportedly been killed while fighting with al-Shabaab in that country. The man, identified by CBC News as Mohammed Elmi Ibrahim, was in his early-20s and had been an English major at the University of Toronto before disappearing some 18 months ago. A video purported to originate from al-Shabaab is the source of the news about his apparent death in combat.
(Last week, the Canadian government added al-Shabaab to its list of outlawed terrorist groups, as a result of the linkage between Shabaab and al-Qaeda.)
It is also being reported that at least five other young men have disappeared since last September, and that all belonged to the same Toronto-area mosque that Ibrahim attended. It is believed that these others may have also joined up with al-Shabaab's forces.
The attraction of young men from North America to head to their ancestral homelands and fight for a cause is nothing new. In just the last two decades, members of many ethnic groups living in Canada have taken up arms to fight abroad (think, for instance, of the Balkan wars). In this case, though, it has rattled many Somali-Canadians - and a number of other observers - who fear that that extremists are actively recruiting from within the community and those individuals could return here and pose security risks. It should be noted, however, that support for al-Shabaab among Somali-Canadians appears to be marginal, at best.
But some young men do appear to be heading to the Horn of Africa to fight. There's an excellent article by The National Post's Stewart Bell that was posted yesterday, in which the journalist provides an in-depth perspective of just what the attractions are for young Somali-Canadians. It centers on the experiences on one man who left Toronto to take up arms with al-Shabaab before becoming disillusioned with the group's ideologies and returning to Canada last year. Well worth a read for anyone wondering what propels someone to leave the comforts of North America and head to a war zone.
Well, it now appears that the problem has spread to the Somali community in Canada. This week news broke that at least one young man who had been living in Toronto had returned to Somalia and reportedly been killed while fighting with al-Shabaab in that country. The man, identified by CBC News as Mohammed Elmi Ibrahim, was in his early-20s and had been an English major at the University of Toronto before disappearing some 18 months ago. A video purported to originate from al-Shabaab is the source of the news about his apparent death in combat.
(Last week, the Canadian government added al-Shabaab to its list of outlawed terrorist groups, as a result of the linkage between Shabaab and al-Qaeda.)
It is also being reported that at least five other young men have disappeared since last September, and that all belonged to the same Toronto-area mosque that Ibrahim attended. It is believed that these others may have also joined up with al-Shabaab's forces.
The attraction of young men from North America to head to their ancestral homelands and fight for a cause is nothing new. In just the last two decades, members of many ethnic groups living in Canada have taken up arms to fight abroad (think, for instance, of the Balkan wars). In this case, though, it has rattled many Somali-Canadians - and a number of other observers - who fear that that extremists are actively recruiting from within the community and those individuals could return here and pose security risks. It should be noted, however, that support for al-Shabaab among Somali-Canadians appears to be marginal, at best.
But some young men do appear to be heading to the Horn of Africa to fight. There's an excellent article by The National Post's Stewart Bell that was posted yesterday, in which the journalist provides an in-depth perspective of just what the attractions are for young Somali-Canadians. It centers on the experiences on one man who left Toronto to take up arms with al-Shabaab before becoming disillusioned with the group's ideologies and returning to Canada last year. Well worth a read for anyone wondering what propels someone to leave the comforts of North America and head to a war zone.
Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Trade To Continue
As I mentioned in my previous post, a gathering of delegates to the CITES convention being held in Doha this week was considering whether to suggest a ban in the trade of Atlantic bluefin tuna. Yesterday those delegates voted 68-20 against an immediate ban, as well as voting 72-43 against a weaker proposal supported by the EU for a ban to commence next year (there are 175 members of CITES in all, though not every nation attended or voted). So fishing of the bluefin tuna will continue without restrictions.
The ban had been supported in general by the EU, as well as individual states including Monaco, the United States, the United Kingdom, Holland, Norway and Kenya, but their delegates were unable to sway other nations attending the convention, notably Japan, Canada and France.
France, though an EU member, felt that any ban should await further scientific research into the health of the tuna stocks. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner was quoted in one media report as saying, "I hope that an irreversible decision will not be made until the danger of extinction is scientifically proved."
Meanwhile, Canadian Fisheries Minister Gail Shea expressed the view that, "Canada's position all along has been that this species should be managed through a regional fish management program," adding, "The challenge will be to strengthen ICCAT [the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna] to ensure that conservation measures are adhered to."
In other words, some nations heavily engaged in fishing feel an urgent need to do something to protect the bluefin population now, while others think the situation can be 'managed' until such time as there is irrefutable proof the species is doomed to extinction. Such is the way that international diplomacy works when it comes to as profitable a business as tuna fishing, where short-term prospects replace long-term stability.
As George Monbiot writes in his blog for The Guardian, the proposed ban(s) would have, indeed, put people out of work. "But the absence of a ban ensures that, after one or two more seasons of fishing at current levels, all the jobs and the entire industry are finished forever," he writes, continuing, "The insistence that the fishing can continue without consequences betrays Olympic-class denial, a flat refusal to look reality in the face."
Monbiot goes on to talk of how the scarcer bluefin become, the higher the price fishing firms can get for their reduced catches. It's simple economics: "Once the fish have been exterminated, the investors can just shift their vast profits into another industry." Such as the tuna stocks off Somalia.
If a group like CITES, which is supposed to protect endangered species, cannot find a way to deal with Atlantic bluefin tuna, one has to wonder how they'd fare with stocks in the Indian Ocean off the Horn of Africa.
The ban had been supported in general by the EU, as well as individual states including Monaco, the United States, the United Kingdom, Holland, Norway and Kenya, but their delegates were unable to sway other nations attending the convention, notably Japan, Canada and France.
France, though an EU member, felt that any ban should await further scientific research into the health of the tuna stocks. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner was quoted in one media report as saying, "I hope that an irreversible decision will not be made until the danger of extinction is scientifically proved."
Meanwhile, Canadian Fisheries Minister Gail Shea expressed the view that, "Canada's position all along has been that this species should be managed through a regional fish management program," adding, "The challenge will be to strengthen ICCAT [the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna] to ensure that conservation measures are adhered to."
In other words, some nations heavily engaged in fishing feel an urgent need to do something to protect the bluefin population now, while others think the situation can be 'managed' until such time as there is irrefutable proof the species is doomed to extinction. Such is the way that international diplomacy works when it comes to as profitable a business as tuna fishing, where short-term prospects replace long-term stability.
As George Monbiot writes in his blog for The Guardian, the proposed ban(s) would have, indeed, put people out of work. "But the absence of a ban ensures that, after one or two more seasons of fishing at current levels, all the jobs and the entire industry are finished forever," he writes, continuing, "The insistence that the fishing can continue without consequences betrays Olympic-class denial, a flat refusal to look reality in the face."
Monbiot goes on to talk of how the scarcer bluefin become, the higher the price fishing firms can get for their reduced catches. It's simple economics: "Once the fish have been exterminated, the investors can just shift their vast profits into another industry." Such as the tuna stocks off Somalia.
If a group like CITES, which is supposed to protect endangered species, cannot find a way to deal with Atlantic bluefin tuna, one has to wonder how they'd fare with stocks in the Indian Ocean off the Horn of Africa.
Wednesday, February 3, 2010
Some new thoughts on how to combat piracy off Somalia
As February begins, things remain relatively quiet in the seas off the Horn of Africa (HoA) in terms of piracy. Attacks are still occurring, such as the successful hijacking of a North Korean freighter earlier today - which occurred one day after another vessel was released - but the effect of the winter monsoon off East Africa is giving everyone a brief respite before things heat up again next month. This provides a perfect opportunity to take a deeper look at some potential means of stemming the scourge of maritime crime that has been causing so many problems in that region of the world. And there's a lot to talk about.
I have a couple of new ideas to put forth about all this, but, before I get to those, I'd like to highlight some other thoughts that came from a recent gathering held last December at Harvard's Kennedy School. Some two dozen analysts, diplomats, scholars, military personnel and other experts came together under the auspices of the World Peace Foundation (website here) as the Cambridge Coalition to Combat Piracy. It's unfortunate there has been little public notice of this gathering, as they put together an interesting policy brief summarizing their collective ideas. You can download it as a PDF via the WPF website by clicking on "Policy Briefs". (And, for the record, I was not part of this event, though several colleagues were, including Canadian government security and justice analyst Patrick Lennox and Andrew Mwangura from the East African Seafarer's Assistance Programme.)
What the Cambridge Coalition came up with are a series of 38 recommendations dealing with everything from how to discourage pirates on land, to shutting down the money trail, making ships harder to capture and strengthening the legal responses to dealing with this maritime criminal activity. To those who have followed this blog, read my book or are otherwise well-informed about modern-day piracy, many of the recommendations will be obvious.
One of the most interesting ideas put forth is the idea of establishing a regional African judicial center to prosecute suspected pirates. Though I've mused in the past about setting up an admiralty court in someplace like London or The Hague, I now realize that this could prove counter-productive. As the Cambridge Coalition suggests, setting up a "piracy court" in somewhere like Somaliland or Djibouti would be stronger. It could be an African court, with African legal personnel dealing with African suspects. Doing so would alleviate the negative impact among the Somali people that can arise when suspects are removed to Europe or America for prosecution, leading some locals to say that that Westerners - or former colonizers - are imposing their will with a harsh manner.
Piracy can never be eradicated, contained or effectively suppressed without dealing with the root causes ashore that attract individuals to head out to sea to attack passing vessels. And while the international community cannot solve all of Somalia's problems with a quick stroke, I do believe there are a couple of other options that the Cambridge Coalition did not address, which have not been brought up elsewhere, to my knowledge.
First, I suggest that the international community declare a moratorium on all foreign fishing within 200 nautical miles of the Somali coast (that is, their Exclusive Economic Zone - EEZ). This would allow Somali fishermen who claim to have turned to piracy because of the foreign fishers to be allowed to work in safety. And it would undermine any of the claims being put forth that Somali pirate gangs are somehow "defending" their own people.
It would also mean that any Somali who really did want to just fish - not pirate - could do so without impediment. It's an opportunity in a place where few exist, so why not try it? And though such an action will cause some economic problems for a variety of foreign nations working the seas off Somalia, that's too bad. A higher price for tuna in European or Asian markets, for instance, is a small price to pay. Besides, Western nations - such as Canada - have enforced their own closed fisheries in the recent past when so required.
To enforce this concept, I suggest that the international community divert some its resources away from blue water naval patrols to littoral operations in aid of the Somali people. For less than the cost of the deployment of a single warship, several inshore/offshore patrol craft could be made available to the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). (And, by the way, we should stop calling that entity "transitional". Either it's the recognized government or it isn't. After so many years, the so-called TFG is anything but transitory.)
Patrol craft could operate - with Somali officials aboard - to enforce the no-fishing ban, as well as deterring illegal waste dumping. It would also provide training to the Somalis about international regulations and practices so that could then take over operations at a later date. International forces have been doing this for decades, in places as diverse as Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, so why not Somalia? And there are numerous American and British personnel with experience guarding coasts in the Persian Gulf, to say nothing of all the CG elements already trained in these practices in numerous other nations.
Neither of the ideas I'm putting forth will conclusively see the end of piracy off the HoA, but they are put forth as a potential means of aiding the Somali people in their own battles against criminal gangs. To date, our actions at sea have ignored the causes ashore, which is a big mistake. And the idea that we're clouded by past experiences in Somalia needs to be put aside. Politically speaking - and with respect to those who were involved - "Black Hawk Down" (for Americans) or "Belet Huen" (for Canadians) were parts of operations that should not have been forsaken. We are still picking up the pieces from our cowardly actions, and hoping that merchant sailors don't pay the price. Literally.
I have a couple of new ideas to put forth about all this, but, before I get to those, I'd like to highlight some other thoughts that came from a recent gathering held last December at Harvard's Kennedy School. Some two dozen analysts, diplomats, scholars, military personnel and other experts came together under the auspices of the World Peace Foundation (website here) as the Cambridge Coalition to Combat Piracy. It's unfortunate there has been little public notice of this gathering, as they put together an interesting policy brief summarizing their collective ideas. You can download it as a PDF via the WPF website by clicking on "Policy Briefs". (And, for the record, I was not part of this event, though several colleagues were, including Canadian government security and justice analyst Patrick Lennox and Andrew Mwangura from the East African Seafarer's Assistance Programme.)
What the Cambridge Coalition came up with are a series of 38 recommendations dealing with everything from how to discourage pirates on land, to shutting down the money trail, making ships harder to capture and strengthening the legal responses to dealing with this maritime criminal activity. To those who have followed this blog, read my book or are otherwise well-informed about modern-day piracy, many of the recommendations will be obvious.
One of the most interesting ideas put forth is the idea of establishing a regional African judicial center to prosecute suspected pirates. Though I've mused in the past about setting up an admiralty court in someplace like London or The Hague, I now realize that this could prove counter-productive. As the Cambridge Coalition suggests, setting up a "piracy court" in somewhere like Somaliland or Djibouti would be stronger. It could be an African court, with African legal personnel dealing with African suspects. Doing so would alleviate the negative impact among the Somali people that can arise when suspects are removed to Europe or America for prosecution, leading some locals to say that that Westerners - or former colonizers - are imposing their will with a harsh manner.
Piracy can never be eradicated, contained or effectively suppressed without dealing with the root causes ashore that attract individuals to head out to sea to attack passing vessels. And while the international community cannot solve all of Somalia's problems with a quick stroke, I do believe there are a couple of other options that the Cambridge Coalition did not address, which have not been brought up elsewhere, to my knowledge.
First, I suggest that the international community declare a moratorium on all foreign fishing within 200 nautical miles of the Somali coast (that is, their Exclusive Economic Zone - EEZ). This would allow Somali fishermen who claim to have turned to piracy because of the foreign fishers to be allowed to work in safety. And it would undermine any of the claims being put forth that Somali pirate gangs are somehow "defending" their own people.It would also mean that any Somali who really did want to just fish - not pirate - could do so without impediment. It's an opportunity in a place where few exist, so why not try it? And though such an action will cause some economic problems for a variety of foreign nations working the seas off Somalia, that's too bad. A higher price for tuna in European or Asian markets, for instance, is a small price to pay. Besides, Western nations - such as Canada - have enforced their own closed fisheries in the recent past when so required.
To enforce this concept, I suggest that the international community divert some its resources away from blue water naval patrols to littoral operations in aid of the Somali people. For less than the cost of the deployment of a single warship, several inshore/offshore patrol craft could be made available to the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). (And, by the way, we should stop calling that entity "transitional". Either it's the recognized government or it isn't. After so many years, the so-called TFG is anything but transitory.)
Patrol craft could operate - with Somali officials aboard - to enforce the no-fishing ban, as well as deterring illegal waste dumping. It would also provide training to the Somalis about international regulations and practices so that could then take over operations at a later date. International forces have been doing this for decades, in places as diverse as Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, so why not Somalia? And there are numerous American and British personnel with experience guarding coasts in the Persian Gulf, to say nothing of all the CG elements already trained in these practices in numerous other nations.
Neither of the ideas I'm putting forth will conclusively see the end of piracy off the HoA, but they are put forth as a potential means of aiding the Somali people in their own battles against criminal gangs. To date, our actions at sea have ignored the causes ashore, which is a big mistake. And the idea that we're clouded by past experiences in Somalia needs to be put aside. Politically speaking - and with respect to those who were involved - "Black Hawk Down" (for Americans) or "Belet Huen" (for Canadians) were parts of operations that should not have been forsaken. We are still picking up the pieces from our cowardly actions, and hoping that merchant sailors don't pay the price. Literally.
Tuesday, February 2, 2010
Al-Shabaab's intentions to expand their operations beyond Somalia
As I wrote in my last post, the Somali Islamist group al-Shabaab has now partnered with a smaller rebel group, the Ras Kamboni Brigade. Bill Roggio at Long War Journal has been following the situation in Somalia for some time and has posted the English-language text of the merger of the two groups that was announced last Friday via the internet. As the announcement states, the two groups are now to be known as "Al Shabaab Mujahideen Movement", with a focus on continuing, "[T]he fight against enemies of Allah and to seek the establishment of an Islamic government," presumably in Somalia.
Though the group's press release doesn't deal with Shabaab's intention to cement their allegiance to al-Qaeda, it does allude to a broader campaign. Near the end of statement, the two groups (Shabaab and Ras Kamboni) agreed, "To counter the international crusaders' war against Muslims and to combine the jihad of the Horn of Africa with the international jihad."
In case anyone's interested, this is a clear indication that a relatively small group of Somalis, aided by foreign assistance, mean to expand their until now localized campaign into something broader. And the implications of this for both the international community as well as the Somali people are serious. If Shabaab's fighters carry through with their threat, Somalia is no longer about about famine, lawlessness and piracy.
Though the group's press release doesn't deal with Shabaab's intention to cement their allegiance to al-Qaeda, it does allude to a broader campaign. Near the end of statement, the two groups (Shabaab and Ras Kamboni) agreed, "To counter the international crusaders' war against Muslims and to combine the jihad of the Horn of Africa with the international jihad."
In case anyone's interested, this is a clear indication that a relatively small group of Somalis, aided by foreign assistance, mean to expand their until now localized campaign into something broader. And the implications of this for both the international community as well as the Somali people are serious. If Shabaab's fighters carry through with their threat, Somalia is no longer about about famine, lawlessness and piracy.
Monday, February 1, 2010
Al-Shabaab confirms alignment with al-Qaeda: The Implications
The BBC is reporting that the Somali insurgent group al-Shabaab has finally confirmed what many had long suspected, that is that the Islamist fighters are aligning their local efforts with al-Qaeda's broader campaign of "international jihad". As well, the report says that Shabaab has forged an alliance with the Ras Kamboni Brigade, another Islamist group based in the southernmost part of Somalia, close by the border with Kenya. The Kimboni Brigade had previously been allied with Shabaab's main rival, Hizbul Islam, so these mergers change things a bit in the Horn of Africa, and we should be concerned.
Why?
Well, first off, this observer believes there will be a decrease in traditional piracy based out of ports in the southern part of Somalia, that is from Mogadishu to the Kenyan border (the land controlled by the Islamists). This hasn't been the main staging area for most attacks of late, and if Shabaab and its allies are serious about their intents of imposing their views of Koranic law (and why should we doubt that?), then it follows they will curtail further operations against shipping for the time being, if only to do what they say they aspire to. That's good, right?
Not really. It also opens up the potential for further external funding from al-Qaeda sources. Instead of looking to ransoms from hijacked ships (a small amount to begin with), Shabaab could see funding for its operations come from a more stable source - al-Qaeda supporters around the world. As Iraq and Afghanistan continue to fall off the international community's radar, the need for Qaeda to continue their misguided campaign create some sort of trans-national, extremist caliphate may push them into a new theater of operations. A southern front, if you will, one that happens to be in a venue in which many supporters can be found in Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, Egypt and even Kenya. So there may be more money and supporters available to bolster Shabaab.
Secondly, this public call of intents may very well increase the possibility that foreign fighters will add to the numbers already believed to be in Somalia today. It is not inconceivable that someone in Pakistan's Northwest Province is not today telling impressionable young men that they should take the fight against the infidels to a new place. Glibly, it's like , "Go south, young man, to a place you can make a better impact." Watch as fighters leave the tumult of the Middle East and Central Asia for the easier pickings of jihad in East Africa.
Finally, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to realize that if you put a bunch of avowed al-Qaeda fans close to one of the most important sea lanes for global commerce, something bad may happen. We know what al-Qaeda is capable of, on at least four continents. And the only place they have effected large-scale maritime operations to date has been in the seas off the Horn of Africa (viz USS Cole and MV Limburg). If pirates can attack a supertanker or cruise ship for money, why couldn't suicide bombers do the same, albeit with a different goal.
And what does all this have to with piracy? It's simple: The international community has been struggling badly for years to deal with maritime criminals attacking shipping opportunistically. Are we prepared for, say, three skiffs laden with explosives aiming for a box ship in the Gulf of Aden or a supertanker near the Seychelles, piloted by individuals with no intent on boarding and hijacking?
I don't think we are.
The inadequacies of dealing with "conventional" piracy are serious. The shipping community, the international naval community and the nations of the world are hiding themselves in the sand about this. I hate to be the pessimist here, and will offer up some ideas shortly, but I worry that something bad's about to happen.
Why?
Well, first off, this observer believes there will be a decrease in traditional piracy based out of ports in the southern part of Somalia, that is from Mogadishu to the Kenyan border (the land controlled by the Islamists). This hasn't been the main staging area for most attacks of late, and if Shabaab and its allies are serious about their intents of imposing their views of Koranic law (and why should we doubt that?), then it follows they will curtail further operations against shipping for the time being, if only to do what they say they aspire to. That's good, right?
Not really. It also opens up the potential for further external funding from al-Qaeda sources. Instead of looking to ransoms from hijacked ships (a small amount to begin with), Shabaab could see funding for its operations come from a more stable source - al-Qaeda supporters around the world. As Iraq and Afghanistan continue to fall off the international community's radar, the need for Qaeda to continue their misguided campaign create some sort of trans-national, extremist caliphate may push them into a new theater of operations. A southern front, if you will, one that happens to be in a venue in which many supporters can be found in Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, Egypt and even Kenya. So there may be more money and supporters available to bolster Shabaab.
Secondly, this public call of intents may very well increase the possibility that foreign fighters will add to the numbers already believed to be in Somalia today. It is not inconceivable that someone in Pakistan's Northwest Province is not today telling impressionable young men that they should take the fight against the infidels to a new place. Glibly, it's like , "Go south, young man, to a place you can make a better impact." Watch as fighters leave the tumult of the Middle East and Central Asia for the easier pickings of jihad in East Africa.
Finally, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to realize that if you put a bunch of avowed al-Qaeda fans close to one of the most important sea lanes for global commerce, something bad may happen. We know what al-Qaeda is capable of, on at least four continents. And the only place they have effected large-scale maritime operations to date has been in the seas off the Horn of Africa (viz USS Cole and MV Limburg). If pirates can attack a supertanker or cruise ship for money, why couldn't suicide bombers do the same, albeit with a different goal.
And what does all this have to with piracy? It's simple: The international community has been struggling badly for years to deal with maritime criminals attacking shipping opportunistically. Are we prepared for, say, three skiffs laden with explosives aiming for a box ship in the Gulf of Aden or a supertanker near the Seychelles, piloted by individuals with no intent on boarding and hijacking?
I don't think we are.
The inadequacies of dealing with "conventional" piracy are serious. The shipping community, the international naval community and the nations of the world are hiding themselves in the sand about this. I hate to be the pessimist here, and will offer up some ideas shortly, but I worry that something bad's about to happen.
Wednesday, December 16, 2009
Al-Qaeda in Somalia: Naming names
At a barely noticed conference earlier this month in Kampala, Uganda, the African Union's Special Representative for Somali - Wafula Wamunyinyi - is quoted as saying that the presence of al-Qaeda in that country is real, something about which the world, "[S]hould be put on notice."
He claims that individuals have been recruited to the Somali-based group al-Shabaab from nations such as the United States, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Uganda and the Sudan. These foreign fighters, according to Wafula, now number 1200, half of whom he claims are Kenyan.
In the SperoNews report, journalist Martyn Drakard details some of those involved in the command structure of the Somali Islamist group, based on information from the AU Special Representative:
"Wafula listed the foreigners holding important positions within Al Shabaab as Sheikh Mohamed Abu Faid, Saudi born, who is the financier and current 'manager' of the group. The head of security and training operations is Abu Musa Mombasa, who arrived recently from Pakistan to replace Saleh Ali Nabhan who was killed in US military operations. Abu Mansur Al-Amriki, an American, heads the finance and payroll department of the foreign fighters, while Mohamoud Mujajir, a Sudanese, is in charge of the recruitment of suicide bombers, he said. Also on the list is Ahmed Abdi Godanem an Al-Qaeda graduate from Afghanistan, and Abu Suleiman Al-Bandiri, a Somali of Yemeni descent."
There is no doubt that foreign fighters have been aiding al-Shabaab: A senior member of that organization admitted as much back in May, as AFP reported, though Sheikh Hussein Ali Fidow categorized those fighters differently: "Those who say our Muslim brothers are foreigners are wrong. They came to assist their brothers in Somalia."
Brethren of the coast, indeed. The American mentioned above - Abu Mansur Al-Amriki ("the American") - is reported to have been born Omar Hammami and raised as a Baptist in Daphne, Alabama (near Mobile), before taking up an extreme form of Islam and leaving the U.S. to, eventually, end up in Somalia. Saleh Ali Nabhan - the head of training new fighters - was killed in mid-September by US Special Forces (see my earlier post about this here).
The biggest problem in dealing with piracy in the seas off Somalia is addressing what's going on ashore, and identifying those who are aiding in the destabilization of the region is of paramount importance. None of the information here is classified or secret, but it is a telling sign that there is intense intelligence-gathering going on in the region. Knowing the names of these individuals is (if correct) a big part of the proverbial intel iceberg.
He claims that individuals have been recruited to the Somali-based group al-Shabaab from nations such as the United States, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Uganda and the Sudan. These foreign fighters, according to Wafula, now number 1200, half of whom he claims are Kenyan.
In the SperoNews report, journalist Martyn Drakard details some of those involved in the command structure of the Somali Islamist group, based on information from the AU Special Representative:
"Wafula listed the foreigners holding important positions within Al Shabaab as Sheikh Mohamed Abu Faid, Saudi born, who is the financier and current 'manager' of the group. The head of security and training operations is Abu Musa Mombasa, who arrived recently from Pakistan to replace Saleh Ali Nabhan who was killed in US military operations. Abu Mansur Al-Amriki, an American, heads the finance and payroll department of the foreign fighters, while Mohamoud Mujajir, a Sudanese, is in charge of the recruitment of suicide bombers, he said. Also on the list is Ahmed Abdi Godanem an Al-Qaeda graduate from Afghanistan, and Abu Suleiman Al-Bandiri, a Somali of Yemeni descent."
There is no doubt that foreign fighters have been aiding al-Shabaab: A senior member of that organization admitted as much back in May, as AFP reported, though Sheikh Hussein Ali Fidow categorized those fighters differently: "Those who say our Muslim brothers are foreigners are wrong. They came to assist their brothers in Somalia."
Brethren of the coast, indeed. The American mentioned above - Abu Mansur Al-Amriki ("the American") - is reported to have been born Omar Hammami and raised as a Baptist in Daphne, Alabama (near Mobile), before taking up an extreme form of Islam and leaving the U.S. to, eventually, end up in Somalia. Saleh Ali Nabhan - the head of training new fighters - was killed in mid-September by US Special Forces (see my earlier post about this here).
The biggest problem in dealing with piracy in the seas off Somalia is addressing what's going on ashore, and identifying those who are aiding in the destabilization of the region is of paramount importance. None of the information here is classified or secret, but it is a telling sign that there is intense intelligence-gathering going on in the region. Knowing the names of these individuals is (if correct) a big part of the proverbial intel iceberg.
Hostages as commodities: It's not just Somalia to be concerned about
There was a lengthy item by Nicholas Schmidle of The New York Times posted a week and a half ago, entitled "The Hostage Business", that's well worth a read. It's about the situation facing those seized by criminals in Nigeria and in it Schmidle quotes the now former inspector-general of the Nigerian National Police, Mike Okiro, as figuring that, "[T]he total amount of ransoms paid in Nigeria between 2006 and 2008 exceeded $100 million."
Assuming Okiro means a two-year period, that's about $50 million annually that has been paid to free hostages. By comparison, most analysts figure Somali gangs gain somewhere in the region of $80 million a year from ransoms (though the Kenyan foreign minister said, a year ago, that the figure could be as high as $150 million).
But even if both the Nigerian and Somalian figures are inflated - which is not unlikely - the point is that while everyone's been worrying about the money being garnered by pirates off the Horn of Africa, their west African brethren having been making similarly massive amounts from the taking of hostages.
Of note in Schmidle's article is the seemingly tempered view that the captors may be taking to their prisoners. Nigerian pirates - and land-based criminals - have had a reputation for ruthlessness and violence that Somali criminals have avoided. The former have been known to main and injure in the past, such as cutting off the ears of mariners. But with the bounties now being paid by firms, these west African criminals appear to have realized what the Somali pirates have long known: A live hostage is far more valuable than a dead one.
And, as the article explains, the money made from ransoms is fueling a mini-economic boom, of sorts, as criminals build homes and buy SUVs. Kind of like in Somalia.
Though many of the kidnappings being discussed in the article occur ashore, the threat that is posed to mariners working in the region is still serious. And unless addressed, we could be looking at two fronts in the battle to combat piracy: East and West Africa.
Assuming Okiro means a two-year period, that's about $50 million annually that has been paid to free hostages. By comparison, most analysts figure Somali gangs gain somewhere in the region of $80 million a year from ransoms (though the Kenyan foreign minister said, a year ago, that the figure could be as high as $150 million).
But even if both the Nigerian and Somalian figures are inflated - which is not unlikely - the point is that while everyone's been worrying about the money being garnered by pirates off the Horn of Africa, their west African brethren having been making similarly massive amounts from the taking of hostages.
Of note in Schmidle's article is the seemingly tempered view that the captors may be taking to their prisoners. Nigerian pirates - and land-based criminals - have had a reputation for ruthlessness and violence that Somali criminals have avoided. The former have been known to main and injure in the past, such as cutting off the ears of mariners. But with the bounties now being paid by firms, these west African criminals appear to have realized what the Somali pirates have long known: A live hostage is far more valuable than a dead one.
And, as the article explains, the money made from ransoms is fueling a mini-economic boom, of sorts, as criminals build homes and buy SUVs. Kind of like in Somalia.
Though many of the kidnappings being discussed in the article occur ashore, the threat that is posed to mariners working in the region is still serious. And unless addressed, we could be looking at two fronts in the battle to combat piracy: East and West Africa.
Thursday, September 17, 2009
Suicide bombings in Mogadishu were revenge for recent US raid: Al-Shabaab
The Somali insurgent group al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for a deadly attack in Mogadishu earlier today that killed at least nine people. Two cars painted to look like UN vehicles made it onto the base where peacekeeping troops from the African Union are quartered, near the airport. One car detonated near a fuel depot, the other nearby. Among those killed was the AU's deputy commander for the mission in Somalia, Major-General Juvenal Niyonguruza, four other officials and the attackers.
A spokesman for al-Shabaab told Reuters that the double suicide bombing was in retaliation for Monday's raid by U.S. special forces, in which suspected al-Qaeda leader Salah Ali Saleh Nabhan was killed. Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage is quoted as saying, "We have got our revenge for our brother Nabhan." He also said that his group believes the "infidel government" and AU peacekeepers are planning to attack al-Shabaab once Ramadan ends. "This is a message to them," said Rage.
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM; website here) comprises some 5,000 troops, from Uganda and Burundi, as well support staff. Since being first deployed in February 2007, the force has seen 33 peacekeepers killed in Somalia, not counting today's fatalities. AMISOM is not involved with counter-piracy operations.
Penetrating the main military base of AMISOM within days of vowing revenge for the US-led raid reveals the organizational capabilities of al-Shabaab, as well as the weakness of the peacekeeping force. But it also reveals a degree of frustration that must be felt by the Somali Islamist group's leadership, since the suicide attack targeted fellow Africans, not the Americans they would have preferred to kill. One wonders if some members of the peacekeeping force are angry with both al-Shabaab and the U.S., and whether this week's incidents will cause other nations to avoid committing their troops to AMISOM or other operations.
On a related note, al-Shabaab also confirmed that they continue to hold a French security consultant who was seized in July (a fellow French captive kidnapped at the same time managed to escape late last month). The group announced a modest list of demands in return for which they would release the man: France must withdraw its security advisors from Somalia and cease supporting the "apostate government of Somalia" militarily or politically; the AU's troops are to be removed; mujahideen fighters being held in other countries are to be released; and French warships deployed in counter-piracy operations off Somalia are to pack up and go home.
Sarcasm aside, it is interesting that al-Shabaab put that last demand in their statement. With the new piracy season about to begin, it could be the group is worried that their pirate allies may not be able to operate as successfully as earlier this year, impacting the financial income that the Islamist group garners from piracy.
A spokesman for al-Shabaab told Reuters that the double suicide bombing was in retaliation for Monday's raid by U.S. special forces, in which suspected al-Qaeda leader Salah Ali Saleh Nabhan was killed. Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage is quoted as saying, "We have got our revenge for our brother Nabhan." He also said that his group believes the "infidel government" and AU peacekeepers are planning to attack al-Shabaab once Ramadan ends. "This is a message to them," said Rage.
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM; website here) comprises some 5,000 troops, from Uganda and Burundi, as well support staff. Since being first deployed in February 2007, the force has seen 33 peacekeepers killed in Somalia, not counting today's fatalities. AMISOM is not involved with counter-piracy operations.
Penetrating the main military base of AMISOM within days of vowing revenge for the US-led raid reveals the organizational capabilities of al-Shabaab, as well as the weakness of the peacekeeping force. But it also reveals a degree of frustration that must be felt by the Somali Islamist group's leadership, since the suicide attack targeted fellow Africans, not the Americans they would have preferred to kill. One wonders if some members of the peacekeeping force are angry with both al-Shabaab and the U.S., and whether this week's incidents will cause other nations to avoid committing their troops to AMISOM or other operations.
On a related note, al-Shabaab also confirmed that they continue to hold a French security consultant who was seized in July (a fellow French captive kidnapped at the same time managed to escape late last month). The group announced a modest list of demands in return for which they would release the man: France must withdraw its security advisors from Somalia and cease supporting the "apostate government of Somalia" militarily or politically; the AU's troops are to be removed; mujahideen fighters being held in other countries are to be released; and French warships deployed in counter-piracy operations off Somalia are to pack up and go home.
Sarcasm aside, it is interesting that al-Shabaab put that last demand in their statement. With the new piracy season about to begin, it could be the group is worried that their pirate allies may not be able to operate as successfully as earlier this year, impacting the financial income that the Islamist group garners from piracy.
Tuesday, September 15, 2009
Attack against Somali insurgents was U.S. operation
In an update on yesterday's report about a raid carried out in southern Somalia, various sources such as the BBC and The Associated Press are saying that it was an American-led operation. According to unnamed government sources, the commando-style operation involved forces from the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command and was carried out in the region of the southern coastal village of Barawe on Monday. Helicopters arriving from a US Navy vessel stationed offshore strafed a vehicle and killed at least two people in it. Two other individuals in the car were captured by the attackers and flown away with the raiders when they departed back into the Indian Ocean. There are no reports of any injuries or deaths to the raiders.
According to the BBC report, the target of the raid was Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, a suspected senior al-Qaeda commander in East Africa. The Kenyan-born Islamist extremist is believed to have been involved in the 2002 attack on a resort hotel outside Mombasa that killed 15 people and an unsuccessful attempt to shoot down an Israeli airliner that had just departed that coastal city's airport. He may also have been involved in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) that resulted in over 250 deaths.
Nabhan was reported killed in Monday's incident.
Speaking to the BBC, Andre le Sage of the African Centre at the National Defense University in Washington called Nabhan an important figure in al-Qaeda's East African operations, one who may have liaised with senior commanders in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He most certainly was involved with the Somali group al-Shabaab, reportedly helping the group manage its training camps for foreign fighter. And while le Sage says that Nabhan's death will certainly have an impact on al-Qaeda's capabilities in the region, he adds that al-Shabaab itself may be somewhat less affected. Like pirate gangs, the Islamist group may be able to find any number of willing individuals to fill the gap created by Nabhan's demise.
In the wake of the attack, the BBC also reports that some Somalis are worried about the potential that such actions will push local people into supporting extremist groups like al-Shabaab. An anonymous al-Shabaab commander also told the BBC that they would retaliate against American interests, saying, "They will taste the bitterness of our response."
Monday's attack underscores the increasing concern among many nations that the continued growth of Islamic extremist groups within Somalia needs to be more effectively addressed. The endemic lawlessness in Somalia not only allows militia gangs and pirates to operate with near impunity, but also provides the perfect base from which terror cells can organize and train themselves. As the number of foreign fighters has increased in the area and al-Shabaab and its allies consolidate their control over the southern quarter of Somalia - including the fertile Shabelle region - the situation has become much more serious. It is no longer a case of extremists having a mere toehold in the Horn of Africa; they now control an area the size of Holland and Belgium put together.
Previous reports had Somali eyewitnesses describing the raiders as being French military forces. Whether or not French forces were involved in the operation alongside American troops is not known at this time, though both countries maintain elements in the region, both at sea and ashore (in Djibouti).
According to the BBC report, the target of the raid was Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, a suspected senior al-Qaeda commander in East Africa. The Kenyan-born Islamist extremist is believed to have been involved in the 2002 attack on a resort hotel outside Mombasa that killed 15 people and an unsuccessful attempt to shoot down an Israeli airliner that had just departed that coastal city's airport. He may also have been involved in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) that resulted in over 250 deaths.
Nabhan was reported killed in Monday's incident.
Speaking to the BBC, Andre le Sage of the African Centre at the National Defense University in Washington called Nabhan an important figure in al-Qaeda's East African operations, one who may have liaised with senior commanders in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He most certainly was involved with the Somali group al-Shabaab, reportedly helping the group manage its training camps for foreign fighter. And while le Sage says that Nabhan's death will certainly have an impact on al-Qaeda's capabilities in the region, he adds that al-Shabaab itself may be somewhat less affected. Like pirate gangs, the Islamist group may be able to find any number of willing individuals to fill the gap created by Nabhan's demise.
In the wake of the attack, the BBC also reports that some Somalis are worried about the potential that such actions will push local people into supporting extremist groups like al-Shabaab. An anonymous al-Shabaab commander also told the BBC that they would retaliate against American interests, saying, "They will taste the bitterness of our response."
Monday's attack underscores the increasing concern among many nations that the continued growth of Islamic extremist groups within Somalia needs to be more effectively addressed. The endemic lawlessness in Somalia not only allows militia gangs and pirates to operate with near impunity, but also provides the perfect base from which terror cells can organize and train themselves. As the number of foreign fighters has increased in the area and al-Shabaab and its allies consolidate their control over the southern quarter of Somalia - including the fertile Shabelle region - the situation has become much more serious. It is no longer a case of extremists having a mere toehold in the Horn of Africa; they now control an area the size of Holland and Belgium put together.
Previous reports had Somali eyewitnesses describing the raiders as being French military forces. Whether or not French forces were involved in the operation alongside American troops is not known at this time, though both countries maintain elements in the region, both at sea and ashore (in Djibouti).
Photos of Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, including retouched versions, from the FBI's wanted list
Tuesday, June 16, 2009
Thoughts on dealing with Somalia from the International Crisis Group
Daniela Kroslak and Andrew Stroehlein of the International Crisis Group (ICG) penned an op-ed piece in the Monday issue of The Globe & Mail newspaper titled "When it comes to Somalia, inaction is not an option". It's worth a look, as it is a given that if we're to really deal with piracy off the Horn of Africa (HoA), we have to address the problems plaguing Somalia that allow criminal activities to flourish there.
To most people, piracy in the region is now old news. Attacks are down and international naval forces are preparing to ramp down their presence in the region. The onset of the summer monsoon has a lot to do with the current situation, of course, so until the main piracy season resumes in Autumn - or an unfortunate Western crew is attacked in the interim by the predations still ongoing (albeit reduced) - attention will swing to other issues, in other places.
But as the ICG authors point out in their article, Somalia is on the verge of slipping into a full-blown civil war, something they call potentially "unprecedented, even by Somalia's grim and bloody standards." The recent arrivals of foreign fighters seeking to take part in what is increasingly becoming a jihad in the southern parts of the country adds another layer to the situation, as does the inaction of other nations in coming to terms with things.
Oddly enough, when Somali pirate attacks were making media headlines there was more interest in looking at Somalia itself than there is currently. Without the dramatic attacks on merchant vessels off the HoA, most have again forgotten Somalia and the Somali people.
This is a mistake, a terrible one that will come back to haunt us in the near future. As warships steam home, battles are waging ashore that pose the potential to destabilize the entire region. And out of that instability will arise the prospect of renewed and enlarged pirate activity. The international community has but a few months to address things ashore before our inaction leads to more pirate attacks on the seas.
To most people, piracy in the region is now old news. Attacks are down and international naval forces are preparing to ramp down their presence in the region. The onset of the summer monsoon has a lot to do with the current situation, of course, so until the main piracy season resumes in Autumn - or an unfortunate Western crew is attacked in the interim by the predations still ongoing (albeit reduced) - attention will swing to other issues, in other places.
But as the ICG authors point out in their article, Somalia is on the verge of slipping into a full-blown civil war, something they call potentially "unprecedented, even by Somalia's grim and bloody standards." The recent arrivals of foreign fighters seeking to take part in what is increasingly becoming a jihad in the southern parts of the country adds another layer to the situation, as does the inaction of other nations in coming to terms with things.
Oddly enough, when Somali pirate attacks were making media headlines there was more interest in looking at Somalia itself than there is currently. Without the dramatic attacks on merchant vessels off the HoA, most have again forgotten Somalia and the Somali people.
This is a mistake, a terrible one that will come back to haunt us in the near future. As warships steam home, battles are waging ashore that pose the potential to destabilize the entire region. And out of that instability will arise the prospect of renewed and enlarged pirate activity. The international community has but a few months to address things ashore before our inaction leads to more pirate attacks on the seas.
Friday, May 29, 2009
Al-Shabaab's foreign fighters and possible money troubles
Following up on an earlier post about foreign fighters showing up in Somalia, here's an update on the situation from a couple of sources:
A Swedish media outlet reports that the Säkerhetspolisen (Sapo), Sweden's security service, believes at least ten young men have left the country to train and fight with al-Shabaab in Somalia. Sapo says, "a handful of people with Swedish passports have been killed in the fighting." And while a number of those who left Sweden were of Somali-background, others are reported to be of mixed ethnicity, attracted by the chance to take up arms in what they see as a global struggle.
That it is not just expatriate Somalis aiding al-Shabaab was confirmed to me by a colleague in East Africa. Speaking by phone earlier today, he briefed me about what he'd seen on his most recent trip through Somalia and, among other things, told me that in the port town of Baraawe the leader of the local contingent of al-Shabaab is a Chechen. Located about halfway between Kismaayo and Mogadishu, Shabaab has been controlled by Baraawe since last November and is one of the areas in which they have imposed their interpretation of Shari'ah law.
My source also says that Shabaab may be encountering some money troubles. He confirms that the group has been receiving some funding from pirate gangs operating in the southern part of Somalia and is encouraging the pirates to continue attacking vessels (in return for a cut of any ransoms garnered). The Islamists are hoping that with all the attention being focused on northern waters - such as the Gulf of Aden - there will be more potential prizes in the southern seas. My contact could not say whether or not this means that pirates will attempt to continue attacking even with the onset of the summer monsoon season, but if Shabaab is facing a money crunch, they might try to convince pirate allies to venture out even if marine conditions may not be the best.
My source also says that Shabaab now control three of the four roads leading into Mogadishu and are preparing for renewed fighting in the next couple of weeks. He said that Ethiopian troops crossed the border into Somalia last week and may be preparing to take on Shabaab in the vicinity of Jawhar, which is just north of the capital and is held by the Islamist group. (Reports that Ethiopian troops have returned are disupted by the government in Addis Abiba.) He added that there are fears in the country that without more support, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) will not be able to effectively deter the hard line Islamists and that Mogadishu will be lost to the latter forces.
Finally, regarding that report that a large group of pirates in Eyl were intending to give up their criminal activities (see previous post here), my contact broke out laughing when I mentioned it. Like me, and many others, my East African colleague felt it was more a public relations stunt than a sincere desire to actually end their pirating days. And he agreed that the summer monsoon season could be a strong factor motivating this event and that the truth could only be found when the fall piracy season begins.
(For more detailed information on recent events in Somalia, see the Armed Conflict Database of the International Institute for Strategic Studies website, located here.)
A Swedish media outlet reports that the Säkerhetspolisen (Sapo), Sweden's security service, believes at least ten young men have left the country to train and fight with al-Shabaab in Somalia. Sapo says, "a handful of people with Swedish passports have been killed in the fighting." And while a number of those who left Sweden were of Somali-background, others are reported to be of mixed ethnicity, attracted by the chance to take up arms in what they see as a global struggle.
That it is not just expatriate Somalis aiding al-Shabaab was confirmed to me by a colleague in East Africa. Speaking by phone earlier today, he briefed me about what he'd seen on his most recent trip through Somalia and, among other things, told me that in the port town of Baraawe the leader of the local contingent of al-Shabaab is a Chechen. Located about halfway between Kismaayo and Mogadishu, Shabaab has been controlled by Baraawe since last November and is one of the areas in which they have imposed their interpretation of Shari'ah law.
My source also says that Shabaab may be encountering some money troubles. He confirms that the group has been receiving some funding from pirate gangs operating in the southern part of Somalia and is encouraging the pirates to continue attacking vessels (in return for a cut of any ransoms garnered). The Islamists are hoping that with all the attention being focused on northern waters - such as the Gulf of Aden - there will be more potential prizes in the southern seas. My contact could not say whether or not this means that pirates will attempt to continue attacking even with the onset of the summer monsoon season, but if Shabaab is facing a money crunch, they might try to convince pirate allies to venture out even if marine conditions may not be the best.
My source also says that Shabaab now control three of the four roads leading into Mogadishu and are preparing for renewed fighting in the next couple of weeks. He said that Ethiopian troops crossed the border into Somalia last week and may be preparing to take on Shabaab in the vicinity of Jawhar, which is just north of the capital and is held by the Islamist group. (Reports that Ethiopian troops have returned are disupted by the government in Addis Abiba.) He added that there are fears in the country that without more support, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) will not be able to effectively deter the hard line Islamists and that Mogadishu will be lost to the latter forces.
Finally, regarding that report that a large group of pirates in Eyl were intending to give up their criminal activities (see previous post here), my contact broke out laughing when I mentioned it. Like me, and many others, my East African colleague felt it was more a public relations stunt than a sincere desire to actually end their pirating days. And he agreed that the summer monsoon season could be a strong factor motivating this event and that the truth could only be found when the fall piracy season begins.
(For more detailed information on recent events in Somalia, see the Armed Conflict Database of the International Institute for Strategic Studies website, located here.)
Friday, May 15, 2009
Foreign fighters in Somalia
Late last month I posted an item about foreign fighters who were arriving in Somalia from abroad, working to aid al-Shabaab in its campaign to create an Islamist state. At that time, it was being reported that there were thought to be two or three dozen of these foreigners. But according to a Reuters report just out, those numbers may have increased - dramatically.
Speaking to reporters in Nairobi, the UN special envoy to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, said that the United States has informed the Security Council that they believe there are between 280 and 300 fighters from other parts of Africa as well as abroad now in Somalia.
Some of these fighters are clearly aiding al-Shabaab in the intense fighting that's been going in and around Mogadishu for the last week: An African Union envoy told other reporters today that an Afghan man was among those killed. Moderate Somali Islamist groups are not giving in so easily to al-Shabaab, and we can expect to see more bloodshed in the weeks ahead.
Speaking to reporters in Nairobi, the UN special envoy to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, said that the United States has informed the Security Council that they believe there are between 280 and 300 fighters from other parts of Africa as well as abroad now in Somalia.
Some of these fighters are clearly aiding al-Shabaab in the intense fighting that's been going in and around Mogadishu for the last week: An African Union envoy told other reporters today that an Afghan man was among those killed. Moderate Somali Islamist groups are not giving in so easily to al-Shabaab, and we can expect to see more bloodshed in the weeks ahead.
Wednesday, April 29, 2009
Terrorist threat may be growing in Somalia
Various media outlets like MSNBC are carrying an AP report that has a number of informed sources saying there is evidence that Islamist militants are filtering into Somalia from the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan and elsewhere in southwest Asia. The head of Africa Command, U.S. general William "Kip" Ward, tells AP that, "There is a level of activity that is troubling, disturbing," adding that, "When you have these vast spaces that are just not governed it provides a haven for support activities, for training to occur."
The number of foreign fighters who may now be in East Africa is thought to total just two or three dozen, but their arrival could herald the start of a new facet in the global war on terror. The idea that Somalia could become the new Afghanistan in East Africa, so to speak, has been discussed for some time. However, as the BBC's Rob Watson wrote last May, there are a number of fundamental differences between the two countries, not the least of which is the opposition that many Somalis have to extremist Islamist groups like al-Shabaab, as well as to foreign fighters arriving there.
Nevertheless, al-Shabaab appears willing to work with outsiders, such as al-Qaeda, in order to further their efforts to gain political control over larger parts of Somalia. If the news that foreign fighters are already in the country are true, this certainly adds another layer of complexity to the threats that Somalia poses to us.
The number of foreign fighters who may now be in East Africa is thought to total just two or three dozen, but their arrival could herald the start of a new facet in the global war on terror. The idea that Somalia could become the new Afghanistan in East Africa, so to speak, has been discussed for some time. However, as the BBC's Rob Watson wrote last May, there are a number of fundamental differences between the two countries, not the least of which is the opposition that many Somalis have to extremist Islamist groups like al-Shabaab, as well as to foreign fighters arriving there.
Nevertheless, al-Shabaab appears willing to work with outsiders, such as al-Qaeda, in order to further their efforts to gain political control over larger parts of Somalia. If the news that foreign fighters are already in the country are true, this certainly adds another layer of complexity to the threats that Somalia poses to us.
Thursday, April 9, 2009
Maersk Alabama incident has people thinking about Somalia
As the Maersk Alabama sails to Mombasa and the USS Bainbridge keeps an eye on the pirates holding Captain Richard Phillips in a lifeboat, there is quite a bit of talk online and on air about the incident, and what to do about things. Many of the comments posted on media websites seem to involve a lot of "Let's go get the pirates with our guns" sort of sensibility, a reflection of the frustrations being felt. The number of postings that suggest putting cannons or other heavy weaponry aboard merchant vessels is staggering. But this isn't going to happen and reveals a lack of understanding about civilian mariners' lives at sea and the various national laws that prevent the arming of merchant vessels.
Then there are the comments posted by would-be experts positing their theories on what's caused piracy to become so endemic off the Horn of Africa and how the law could be applied. Many of these 'legal perspectives' are misguided, or just wrong, and a number otherwise smart people seem to be rushing to provide their own perspectives on the situation without understanding the broader picture.
For instance, there have been a number of sources that consider the Maersk Alabama incident to be an indication that piracy off East Africa is escalating. This appears to be based on the fact that it was an American-flagged vessel with American crew that was attacked. I, however, don't see it in that manner. The Alabama fell victim to a continuing threat that has seen five other vessels recently hijacked. An escalation is when pirates attack a new type of vessel - such as a cruise ship, a supertanker or a vessel laden with munitions and weaponry - or when mariners are injured or killed, or when piracy becomes a source of funding for terrorists. Box ships have been attacked before (and probably will be again), but I seriously doubt the pirates who boarded the Alabama knew the crew was American or targeted them purely because of their nationality.
On the positive side of all these discussions is the growing understanding that to effectively deal with piracy in the region, we need to deal with Somalia itself. Paul Reynolds, BBC News website's world affairs correspondent, has written a piece that suggests adopting a 19th Century approach to things, when gunboat diplomacy was a norm. He quotes Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary, who said, in 1841, "Taking a wasps' nest...is more effective than catching the wasps one by one." Right now that's what all those naval vessels are doing: swatting at individual wasps, so to speak.
(Reynolds also seems to imply in his piece that what's needed are naval commanders more willing to bend the rules when engaging pirates, much like Commodore Stephen Decatur did when the U.S. was battling Barbary Pirates in 1815. He also states that convoys are currently in use for aid vessels going to Kenya and Somalia, which is not completely correct. A warship shadowing a merchant vessel carrying food aid from Mombasa to Somalia doesn't really qualify as a convoy.)
Over at National Review Online, David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey posted a short piece that points out the reluctance of nations to root out the Somali pirate lairs ashore. This is the most effective way to suppress piracy, and has worked over the centuries. However, the likelihood that troops from the U.S. will go ashore in Somalia seems remote, at this stage (to say nothing of forces from Canada, Britain or France). And the African Union troops that have been deployed have proven virtually useless. But without a stabilizing force that is robust in its mandate and accompanied by the suitable political and economic clout to re-build Somalia's vacant infrastructures, the threat of continued violence - both at sea and on land - will continue.
I am, however, not advocating the wholesale invasion of Somalia by foreign troops; it's a far more complex situation than that. Indeed, the most effective stabilizing force would be one that is Somali in origin, not foreign. An excellent look at the domestic situation in Somalia was written last month by Graham Cooke for The Diplomat. Entitled "The Impact of Somali Piracy", it details the perspectives of a number of experts, and looks at the risks created by using force against the Somali pirates, as well as the risks of doing nothing. It also explores the potential threats posed by Islamists in Somalia, and their links to pirate gangs.
If this all seems complicated, it's because it is. But as Chatham House's Roger Middleton is quoted in The Diplomat piece, "[O]ne option the international community does not have is to ignore the problem."
Maersk Alabama update:
Bloomberg is reporting that reinforcements have set out from Somalia to provide some sort of assistance to their pirate brethren who are holding Capt. Phillips hostage. Hope they have enough fuel for the trip there and back, though one has to wonder whether they'll even get close to the scene, what with naval vessels in the area.
Also, Reuters reports that the U.N. special representative for Somalia wants the international community to do more to trace the money trail used by pirates in order to quash their financial backers.
Below is today's update of attacks off Somalia from NATO:
Then there are the comments posted by would-be experts positing their theories on what's caused piracy to become so endemic off the Horn of Africa and how the law could be applied. Many of these 'legal perspectives' are misguided, or just wrong, and a number otherwise smart people seem to be rushing to provide their own perspectives on the situation without understanding the broader picture.
For instance, there have been a number of sources that consider the Maersk Alabama incident to be an indication that piracy off East Africa is escalating. This appears to be based on the fact that it was an American-flagged vessel with American crew that was attacked. I, however, don't see it in that manner. The Alabama fell victim to a continuing threat that has seen five other vessels recently hijacked. An escalation is when pirates attack a new type of vessel - such as a cruise ship, a supertanker or a vessel laden with munitions and weaponry - or when mariners are injured or killed, or when piracy becomes a source of funding for terrorists. Box ships have been attacked before (and probably will be again), but I seriously doubt the pirates who boarded the Alabama knew the crew was American or targeted them purely because of their nationality.
On the positive side of all these discussions is the growing understanding that to effectively deal with piracy in the region, we need to deal with Somalia itself. Paul Reynolds, BBC News website's world affairs correspondent, has written a piece that suggests adopting a 19th Century approach to things, when gunboat diplomacy was a norm. He quotes Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary, who said, in 1841, "Taking a wasps' nest...is more effective than catching the wasps one by one." Right now that's what all those naval vessels are doing: swatting at individual wasps, so to speak.
(Reynolds also seems to imply in his piece that what's needed are naval commanders more willing to bend the rules when engaging pirates, much like Commodore Stephen Decatur did when the U.S. was battling Barbary Pirates in 1815. He also states that convoys are currently in use for aid vessels going to Kenya and Somalia, which is not completely correct. A warship shadowing a merchant vessel carrying food aid from Mombasa to Somalia doesn't really qualify as a convoy.)
Over at National Review Online, David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey posted a short piece that points out the reluctance of nations to root out the Somali pirate lairs ashore. This is the most effective way to suppress piracy, and has worked over the centuries. However, the likelihood that troops from the U.S. will go ashore in Somalia seems remote, at this stage (to say nothing of forces from Canada, Britain or France). And the African Union troops that have been deployed have proven virtually useless. But without a stabilizing force that is robust in its mandate and accompanied by the suitable political and economic clout to re-build Somalia's vacant infrastructures, the threat of continued violence - both at sea and on land - will continue.
I am, however, not advocating the wholesale invasion of Somalia by foreign troops; it's a far more complex situation than that. Indeed, the most effective stabilizing force would be one that is Somali in origin, not foreign. An excellent look at the domestic situation in Somalia was written last month by Graham Cooke for The Diplomat. Entitled "The Impact of Somali Piracy", it details the perspectives of a number of experts, and looks at the risks created by using force against the Somali pirates, as well as the risks of doing nothing. It also explores the potential threats posed by Islamists in Somalia, and their links to pirate gangs.
If this all seems complicated, it's because it is. But as Chatham House's Roger Middleton is quoted in The Diplomat piece, "[O]ne option the international community does not have is to ignore the problem."
Maersk Alabama update:
Bloomberg is reporting that reinforcements have set out from Somalia to provide some sort of assistance to their pirate brethren who are holding Capt. Phillips hostage. Hope they have enough fuel for the trip there and back, though one has to wonder whether they'll even get close to the scene, what with naval vessels in the area.
Also, Reuters reports that the U.N. special representative for Somalia wants the international community to do more to trace the money trail used by pirates in order to quash their financial backers.
Below is today's update of attacks off Somalia from NATO:
Tuesday, March 31, 2009
Yemeni suicide bombers being trained in Somalia?
A couple of weeks ago, on March 15, four South Koreans were killed by a suicide bomber as the tourists were visiting the historic Yemeni town of Shibam, a UNESCO World Heritage site. Speaking to Reuters, an unnamed Yemeni security official claimed the bomber - Abdel Rahman Mehdi al-Aajbari - had been recently trained in Somalia to carry out the attack. The official said that Aajbari had left his home in western Yemen about two months ago.
Meanwhile, The Long War Journal's Jane Novak reports that al-Qaeda has claimed responsiblity for this suicide bombing. Her article, "Yemen's three terror fronts", also details a second, unsuccessful attack in the capital city of Sana'a, carried out three days after Aabjari's deadly bombing. In this incident, South Korean investigators and family of the deceased tourists were targeted as they drove in a convoy of cars by another suicide bomber. Novak writes that al-Qaeda's internet statement says these attacks are part of an effort to "expel the infidels from the Arabian Peninsula".
Meanwhile, The Long War Journal's Jane Novak reports that al-Qaeda has claimed responsiblity for this suicide bombing. Her article, "Yemen's three terror fronts", also details a second, unsuccessful attack in the capital city of Sana'a, carried out three days after Aabjari's deadly bombing. In this incident, South Korean investigators and family of the deceased tourists were targeted as they drove in a convoy of cars by another suicide bomber. Novak writes that al-Qaeda's internet statement says these attacks are part of an effort to "expel the infidels from the Arabian Peninsula".
Saturday, March 14, 2009
Are Somali pirates helping al-Qaeda?
This past week the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency appeared before the Senate Armed Forces committee to provide an assessment of threats facing the United States. Lieutenant General Michael Maples' testimony received notice as he discussed Iran's nuclear capabilities and the various other ongoing threats, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. But within his statements was a small commentary on Somalia that has been overlooked by many, though it's ramifications are potentially far-reaching.
Lt. Gen. Maples touched upon the links between the Somali Islamist group al-Shabaab and the more well-known al-Qaeda, stating that, "Recent propaganda from both al-Qaeda and the Somalia-base terrorist group al-Shabaab highlighting their shared ideology suggests a formal merger announcement is forthcoming."
Such an alliance would allow al-Qaeda to gain a more concrete base of operations in East Africa, within the territory that al-Shabaab already controls in the southern part of Somalia. Given that al-Qaeda has already carried a number of succesful terror attacks in the region, including the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and the seaborne assaults on the USS Cole and the MT Limburg, the transnational security risks this poses are great.
And since al-Shabaab is believed to receive at least some of its funding from pirate gangs operating within its sphere of control, this increases the reasons we have to both stem the tide of piracy off Somalia and address the land-based security issues.
For anyone who still thinks that Somali pirates are just a rag-tag bunch of opportunists whose continued criminal actions do not pose any real threats to us, perhaps Lt. Gen. Maples' testimony will sway you. It is clear, to this observer, that the lawlessness in the seas off Somalia and the anarchy ashore have the potential to create as grave a risk to our national securities as Afghanistan and the Taliban did. That's why we need to forcefully address it.
Lt. Gen. Maples touched upon the links between the Somali Islamist group al-Shabaab and the more well-known al-Qaeda, stating that, "Recent propaganda from both al-Qaeda and the Somalia-base terrorist group al-Shabaab highlighting their shared ideology suggests a formal merger announcement is forthcoming."
Such an alliance would allow al-Qaeda to gain a more concrete base of operations in East Africa, within the territory that al-Shabaab already controls in the southern part of Somalia. Given that al-Qaeda has already carried a number of succesful terror attacks in the region, including the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and the seaborne assaults on the USS Cole and the MT Limburg, the transnational security risks this poses are great.
And since al-Shabaab is believed to receive at least some of its funding from pirate gangs operating within its sphere of control, this increases the reasons we have to both stem the tide of piracy off Somalia and address the land-based security issues.
For anyone who still thinks that Somali pirates are just a rag-tag bunch of opportunists whose continued criminal actions do not pose any real threats to us, perhaps Lt. Gen. Maples' testimony will sway you. It is clear, to this observer, that the lawlessness in the seas off Somalia and the anarchy ashore have the potential to create as grave a risk to our national securities as Afghanistan and the Taliban did. That's why we need to forcefully address it.
Wednesday, February 18, 2009
Somalia's clan system and piracy
Seth Kaplan, a foreign policy analyst based in the U.S., has written an interesting commentary on the Policy Innovations website that offers some fresh thoughts on how to address piracy, and other criminal activities, emanating from Somalia. In particular, Kaplan suggests that outside powers should consider working with the various clans there that wield real, local power within the country, instead of attempting to emplace some kind of arbitrary form of "national" government upon the Somali people.
As Kaplan writes, "The United Nations, Western governments, and donors have been trying to fix Somalia in a way that is convenient for them—by creating a central government. They are more willing to accept the appearance of a cohesive regime than they are to accept the reality that they are simply backing one faction, which just happens to control the purported government.
"Instead of repeatedly trying to foist a Western style top-down state structure on a deeply decentralized society, the international community should work with Somalia's long-standing traditional institutions to build a bottom-up government."
This is a unique idea, one that holds great potential in addressing the need to stop piracy by enlisting the support of local leaders. It requires, however, a huge leap of faith on the part of the various outside institutions that have been trying to grapple with Somalia's rampant lawlessness for over fifteen years. The failures of the national entity that is currently supposed to govern Somalia - the Transitional Federal Government - are many, yet the TFG remains internationally recognized.
What Kaplan advocates is nothing short of a radical new approach to governing Somalia, one that is based not upon the creation of a federal "democratic structure" but, instead, involves the various regional players in a confederational system. This would, however, mean dealing with some of the more nefarious elements operating in Somalia, such as the warlords who control pirate gangs. And talking to the bad guys is not a popular idea in most capitals.
But after all the efforts expended in Somalia to date, none of which have proven successful, perhaps the time has come to consider trying something new. Unless the outside world can find a way to create law and order for the Somali people in their own land, it matters little how many naval warships patrol the Indian Ocean or how many pirates are captured, for there will always be someone willing to head to sea with a Kalashnikov believing he can make money by pirating.
As Kaplan writes, "The United Nations, Western governments, and donors have been trying to fix Somalia in a way that is convenient for them—by creating a central government. They are more willing to accept the appearance of a cohesive regime than they are to accept the reality that they are simply backing one faction, which just happens to control the purported government.
"Instead of repeatedly trying to foist a Western style top-down state structure on a deeply decentralized society, the international community should work with Somalia's long-standing traditional institutions to build a bottom-up government."
This is a unique idea, one that holds great potential in addressing the need to stop piracy by enlisting the support of local leaders. It requires, however, a huge leap of faith on the part of the various outside institutions that have been trying to grapple with Somalia's rampant lawlessness for over fifteen years. The failures of the national entity that is currently supposed to govern Somalia - the Transitional Federal Government - are many, yet the TFG remains internationally recognized.
What Kaplan advocates is nothing short of a radical new approach to governing Somalia, one that is based not upon the creation of a federal "democratic structure" but, instead, involves the various regional players in a confederational system. This would, however, mean dealing with some of the more nefarious elements operating in Somalia, such as the warlords who control pirate gangs. And talking to the bad guys is not a popular idea in most capitals.
But after all the efforts expended in Somalia to date, none of which have proven successful, perhaps the time has come to consider trying something new. Unless the outside world can find a way to create law and order for the Somali people in their own land, it matters little how many naval warships patrol the Indian Ocean or how many pirates are captured, for there will always be someone willing to head to sea with a Kalashnikov believing he can make money by pirating.
Wednesday, February 4, 2009
Somali journalist murdered in Mogadishu
HornAfrik director Said Tahlil Ahmed(photo: NUSJ)
The BBC has just reported that the head of HornAfrik, an independent media outlet based in Somalia, was shot dead earlier today while heading to a press conference called by the al-Shabab Islamist militia. Said Tahlil Ahmed was killed near the central Bakara Market by masked gunmen, though no one has yet claimed responsibility for the incident.
Al-Shabab had invited local journalists to a briefing at a militia facility near the market, in order to discuss "the situation in the country". A spokesperson for al-Shabab, Sheikh Ali Mohamad Hussein, told the BBC's Somali Service that the group denies any involvement in Tahlil's killing, instead placing the blame for the murder on unnamed enemies seeking to "defame" the Islamist militia that now controls much of the southern part of the country, including the site of the interim parliament, the town of Baidoa.
Somalis carry Tahlil's body after his assassination earlier today(photo: Ismail Kofi)
Said Tahlil Ahmed is the third senior journalist from HornAfrik to be killed in the last two years. He assumed the position of director of the radio station in 2007, following the death of Ali Iman Sharmake, who was killed by an IED was traveling with his colleague, Sahal Abdulle (who was seriously injured). At least a dozen journalists have been killed in Somalia in the last two years.
UPDATE:
I have just received word from my colleague Sahal Abdulle about his friend Tahlil's death. (Abdulle is the former Reuters bureau chief in Mogadishu and recipient of PEN USA's 2007 Freedom to Write Award.) From East Africa, Abdulle tells me that people are in a state of shock about the incident, and that he is particularly concerned about what will become of Tahlil's six children, the youngest of whom is three months old.
He also pointed me to a Washington Post article from November 12, 2007, in which journalist Stephanie McCrummen spoke to both Abdulle and Said Tahlil Ahmed. McCrummen began her piece by saying that, "Since two of his colleagues were assasintated in September, Said Tahlil has come to speak of his own violent death as a near certainty. Being a journalist in the Somali capital of Mogadishu, he has made his peace with God."
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